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NEW RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE
UNITED STATES TAX COURT: HOW ARE THEY WORKING?
W.

M. DRENNEN*

In 1973 the U.S. Tax Court adopted completely new rules of practice and
procedure, which became effective January 1, 1974. This article first discusses
briefly the historical background of the rules and then examines generally
how the new rules are working in practice, and discusses the opinions and
Memoranda Sur Orders issued by the court during its first 15 months of
experience applying the rules.
For almost 50 years proceedings in the Tax Court and its predecessor,
the Board of Tax Appeals, were conducted under rules of practice and procedure that were first adopted soon after the creation of the Board of Tax
Appeals in 1924. Those rules were rather limited in scope but were flexible,
designed for use in a centralized court having nationwide jurisdiction in tax
matters only, with headquarters in Washington, D.C., and with individual
judges conducting trial sessions throughout the country without juries. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were not adopted by the court
because many of them were not adaptable to proceedings in the Tax Court.
Few basic changes were made in these rules until 1963 when several alterations were made to comply with suggestions made by the tax bar.
The most fundamental rule upon which the court has always had to rely
to avoid excessive trial work is the rule requiring the parties, prior to trial
and without the assistance of the court, to stipulate evidence to the fullest
extent to which complete or qualified agreement can be reached, including
all material facts that are not or fairly should not be in dispute. Prior to
adoption of the new rules, the Tax Court rules made no provision for discovery or other procedures for obtaining evidence in advance of trial from
the opposing party or third parties. Fortunately, under the stipulation procedure, there was a rather free exchange of information between the parties
without the aid of discovery.

At the annual meeting of the Section of Taxation of the American Bar
Association in San Francisco in 1962, there was a spirited floor debate over
whether the Section should adopt a proposal recommending that the United
States district courts be given concurrent jurisdiction with the Tax Court in
deficiency tax cases., Some of the principal arguments advanced by the pro-B.S. 1936, LL.B. 1938, Ohio State University; Judge, formerly Chief Judge, United States
Tax Court.
1. The Board of Tax Appeals was established to provide a forum wherein taxpayers
could obtain a judicial determination of their tax liabilities without first having to pay

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1975], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

ponents of the proposal were that the rules of the Tax Court differed from
the FRCP, thus requiring practitioners to be familiar with two different sets
of rules; that the Tax Court rules did not provide for discovery or pre-trial
procedures, thus hampering litigants in preparing for trial; and that the
stipulation rule of the Tax Court had no teeth in it providing for enforcement in the event the opposing party refused to stipulate. While the writer
believes these arguments were made not so much in a desire to obtain discovery in Tax Court cases as to obtain the right to forum shop in all tax
cases, they nevertheless caused some concern to the Tax Court. Subsequent
to that meeting the Tax Court gave consideration to amending its rules to
bring them more nearly into line with the federal rules, but the court concluded that because it was a centralized court with nationwide jurisdiction,
it would be very difficult for it to properly administer and enforce discovery
if provision was made therefor. However, the court found validity in the
argument that the stipulation rule contained no specific procedure for en2
forcement and also that some form of pre-trial procedure would be helpful.
As a result of this impetus the Tax Court did amend its rules in 1963
to provide for pre-trial conferences (Rule 28) and to provide a procedure
for having facts deemed admitted for purposes of the trial if the opposing
party refused to stipulate facts which reasonably should have been stipulated
(Rule 31(b)(5)). While these rules were of some benefit, many practitioners
thought the procedures were too cumbersome and were completed too late
in the preparation for trial to be utilized to any great extent.
The next impetus for changing the Tax Court rules was provided at the
hearings before Senator Joseph M. Tydings' Subcommittee on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery in 1967 and 1968. Consideration was being given to
judicial procedures for handling federal tax matters, and the Department
of Justice was directed to make a survey of the present system and recommend
any changes that it thought might improve the system. The Department of
Justice study was submitted to the subcommittee in the spring of 1968. It
pointed out the differences in procedure in the district courts, the Court of
Claims, and the Tax Court and the fact that there was no provision for discovery in the Tax Court rules, which made it more difficult for litigants in
deficiency cases to prepare for trial. The report suggested various alternatives
for improving the federal judicial system for handling tax matters, several
of which involved removing the Tax Court from its status as an independent
agency in the executive branch of the government and making it a constitutional court under Article III, and then granting all three courts concurrent
jurisdiction in both refund and deficiency tax cases.
Subsequently, Senator Tydings introduced seven separate bills in the
Senate, each containing alternative proposals for improving the federal judicial
the deficiency determined by the Internal Revenue Service and suing for a refund in the
district court or the Court of Claims. To date, the Tax Court has only deficiency jurisdiction and the district courts and the Court of Claims have only refund jurisdiction.
2. In the earlier days of travel by railroad the judges of the Tax Court were not as
readily available to conduct pre-trial proceedings in the field as they are now with the
speedier air transportation.
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machinery for handling tax cases in accordance with the suggestions contained in the Justice Department report. The bills, however, were never
considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee and died when Senator Tydings
failed of reelection. But in the following session of Congress, rather sweeping
changes were made with regard to the status of the Tax Court by the Tax
Reform Act of 1969. While the Act did not in any way change the jurisdiction
of any of the three federal courts in tax litigation, it did remove the Tax
Court from the executive branch and established it as a legislative court under
Article 1 of the Constitution.
As a result of the change in its status, the judges of the Tax Court believed it was a propitious time to reexamine its rules of practice and procedure, and its Rules Committee, under the chairmanship of Judge Arnold
Raum, undertook the task. Basically the court believed that its rules should
parallel as nearly as feasible the FRCP and efforts were directed along that
line. Advice and recommendations were sought'and received from the Chidf
Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service, the Section of Taxatibn of 'the
American Bar Association, and various tax bar groups and individual
practitioners. While the recommendations varied from A to Z, it seemed to
be the consensus that the rules should contain provisions for discovery and
other pre-trial procedures for obtaining evidence prior to trial. With some
misgivings the court decided to include in its new rules some limited procedures for discovery, admissions, and other pre-trial procedures. The reason
for the court's reluctance to provide for discovery was twofold. First and
foremost, it was feared that discovery would undermine and tend to become
a substitute for the stipulation procedure, which had for so long been the
backbone of the Tax Court procedures and without which it could not
operate efficiently. Second, it was feared that the court's dockets and the
judges might become mired in proceedings to administer and enforce discovery proceedings. Nevertheless, the court felt that if there was a demand
for some of the more modern tools for aid in preparation for trial, such tools
should be provided. Therefore, the new rules contained provisions for (limited)
discovery by written interrogatories and by motions to produce documents
and things. Provision was also made for requesting admissions, which is not
a form of discovery but is an aid in preparation for trial. However, these
procedures were made available only with the strong admonition that the
court continued to expect full stipulations of fact; that the discovery procedures were to be used, not as a substitute for stipulations, but as an aid
thereto; and that if discovery was used by the parties to harass an opponent
or to delay readiness for trial, or if the court became involved in too much
monitoring of discovery to the point that it interfered with its handling
and disposition of cases on their merits, it might reconsider the use of discovery and eliminate provision therefor from the rules.
The new rules were adopted by the court in June of 1973, to become
effective January 1, 1974, and have been in use about 15 months as of the
date of this writing. These rules are much more complete than the previous
rules and conform insofar as practicable with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure used-in, the district courts .andwith the Rules of the -United States
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Court of Claims. Of course, many of the federal rules, such as the rules relating to juries, are not applicable to Tax Court proceedings. Thus the Tax
Court rules are probably more similar to the rules of the Court of Claims than
to the federal rules. However, where feasible the new rules were conformed
to the federal rules so that decisions interpreting and applying those rules
could be used as precedents in interpreting and applying the Tax Court rules.
The most important and controversial of the rather sweeping changes in
the Tax Court rules appear in the area of discovery and other pre-trial procedures. Provisions for discovery are contained in Title VII; provisions for
taking nondiscovery depositions are contained in Title VIII; rules relating
to admissions and stipulations are contained in Title IX; provisions for enforcement and administration of discovery, depositions and admissions appear
in Title X; and pre-trial conference procedures are provided for in Title XI.
Other changes of note are contained in Title VI, which, for the first time,
makes provision for permissive joinder of parties and misjoinder of parties,
and in Title XII, which, for the first time, specifically provides for judgment
on the pleadings, summary judgment, defaults, and dismissals. In some of
these areas, the Court had acted without specific rules, but the rules clarify
the procedures.
Before examining the various opinions and memoranda interpreting and
applying the new rules during the first 15 months of their use, this article
will briefly discuss the use of the discovery procedures from the standpoint of
the judges of the Tax Court. The discovery tools provided in Title IX should
be used without the involvement of the court. Such has been the experience
of some of the judges. Other judges have not been so fortunate; time and
again they have been called upon to rule on motions either for enforcement
of discovery or for protective orders. The Chief Judge, who hears most
of the motions calendars, reports that an alarming number of such motions
are being filed and that some litigants on both sides of the cases are overusing
or abusing the discovery procedures to such an extent that the opposing
parties are unable properly to prepare for trial. This is most unfortunate
because, while the court has the power to intervene in these disputes once
they are brought to its attention, such intervention involves a burdensome
waste of time and expense that interferes with the speedy and orderly disposition of cases brought before the court. There have been rumblings of
late by some Tax Court judges that the court should delete the discovery rules.
The writer, for one, believes that this is an alarmist position and that it
will take three or four years for the court to issue a sufficient number of
rulings on the rules to provide guidelines for their proper use. If the discovery
tools are helpful to litigants in the Tax Court, the court should provide
those tools even though their use may place a heavier burden on the judges
of the court. But if they are misused for purposes of harassment and delay,
their effectiveness will be undermined and the court will probably write
discovery out of its rules. Even this writer feels that if discovery procedures are
shown to be interfering with the stipulation procedure, which is so vital
to the functioning of this court, the discovery procedures should be eliminated.
Only time will tell, but the warning flags are beginning to fly.
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In some areas of the country the discovery procedures are apparently
little used; in other areas they are overused. Of course, resort to discovery
depends to a large extent on the spirit of cooperation existing between the
litigants and between their counsel. When the court has issued sufficient
guideline opinions on what is discoverable and what is not, voluntary disclosure during the stipulation process should be the standard procedure and
resort to discovery should seldom be necessary.
All of the judges of the Tax Court have had occasion to issue rulings interpreting and applying the new rules, although the Chief Judge, who hears
most of the motions calendars in Washington, has had the occasion to do so
most frequently. When a judge encounters such motions on trial calendars,
he may rule on them orally from the bench, in which event he will not
write a memorandum stating his reasons. Or he may take motions under
advisement and rule on them after he has had an opportunity to consider
them in the light of the arguments presented by the parties, either orally or
on brief. Again, he may either grant or deny a motion without stating his
reasons. More frequently, however, he will write either an opinion or a
Memorandum Sur Order, which is simply attached to the order and placed in
the file of that particular case, stating the reasons for his ruling. His writing
must be reviewed by either the Chief Judge or one other judge of the court
before it is released. These writings become memorials of the court's rulings
interpreting and applying the new rules.
If the ruling is contained in a regular opinion of the Tax Court, it is
published by the court in the Tax Court Reports and is readily available to
anyone interested. If it is contained in a memorandum opinion of the court,
it will ordinarily be published by one of the tax services and is also readily
available to anyone interested. If, however, it is contained in a Memorandum
Sur Order that is simply attached to an order in a particular case, it will not
be officially published by anyone, and it will be difficult for anyone researching
the rule to find it.
All of these unpublished rulings are available to Chief Counsel of the
Internal Revenue Service and his attorneys because they are involved in all
litigation in the Tax Court. The private practitioner, however, seldom knows
of such rulings and may feel some embarrassment if counsel for respondent
makes reference to such a ruling concerning which petitioner's counsel has
no knowledge. Furthermore, if they are readily available, such unpublished
rulings, as well as the published opinions, can serve as guidelines to other
judges and the litigants. Accordingly, the Chief Judge intends to publish
more of these rulings and has instructed the clerk of the court to keep a file
of all unpublished rulings, which will be available to the public on request.
With respect to the rulings that have been issued in one form or another
during the first 15 months that the rules have been effective, the majority of
them, and naturally those of most interest, involve discovery. However, other
rules have come under scrutiny and a brief resume of them might help
practitioners read the court's pulse in applying the new rules. The writer
believes the discussion that follows either cites or makes reference to all
rulings pertaining to the new rules that have been issued from the time
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the new rules became effective to April 1, 1975, whether the ruling was issued
in the form of a published opinion, a Memorandum Opinion, or a Memorandum Sur Order, except for a few that simply duplicate prior rulings. The
writer hopes this discussion will give all parties and practitioners in this
court knowledge of the rulings that have been made and at least a reference
to the files in which they can be found.
It seems apparent from the rulings issued to date that the judges of the
Tax Court will interpret and apply the new rules broadly if the ends of justice
are served thereby and that discovery will be permitted of almost any matter
that is relevant and not privileged, but that they expect the parties to make
a serious and determined effort to consult toward stipulating facts and settling
issues before involving the court in discovery procedures.
RULES DECISIONS

Pleadings and Parties
Rule 22 provides that any pleadings or papers to be filed with the court
must be filed with the clerk in Washington, D.C., except as otherwise directed
by a presiding judge or the court. It is basically the same as old Rule 5. In
what was originally issued as a Memorandum Sur Order, but has since been
issued as a published opinion in Abbott & Anita Hoffman, 63 T.C. No. 60
(Mar. 12, 1975), the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction because it was not timely filed. The petition had apparently been timely mailed
in an envelope addressed to the Tax Court at its court room facilities in New
York City at a time when the court was not sitting in New York and was
not forwarded to the clerk in Washington until after the 90th day. Relying
on Rule 22, the court held that the timely mailing-timely filing provision
of section 7502(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code was not applicable because
the envelope was not properly addressed to the Tax Court as required by that
section; and since it was not received in Washington until after the 90th
day, the court had no jurisdiction.
As an aside, the rather numerous late filing cases cause the court considerable concern. Although the judges will do whatever they feel they may
do to avoid dismissing cases for late filing, since timely filing is a jurisdictional
matter, under the law they are frequently unable to afford the late filer any
relief.
Rule 34(a) contains new general provisions relative to petitions filed to
initiate cases. It provides that where a notice of deficiency is directed to
more than one person, each person desiring to contest it may file a separate
or joint petition, but each person in a joint petition must individually satisfy
all the requirements of the rule, which requires that each joint petitioner or
his counsel sign the petition. New Rule 41(a) provides that after expiration
of the time allowed for filing the petition, no amendment of the petition will
be allowed that would involve conferring jurisdiction on the court over a
matter which otherwise would not come within its jurisdiction under the
petition as then on file. In a Memorandum Sur Order entered July 15, 1974,
in Frank E. & Yolanda Curry, Docket No. 1073-74S, the court dismissed
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the petition as to Yolanda under the following circumstances. A letter was
timely received, signed by Frank alone, challenging the proposed adjustments. Yolanda's name did not appear anywhere in the letter and the
singular pronoun was used throughout. An amended petition, signed by
both Frank and Yolanda, was filed after the 90th day. In prior cases where
the spouse's name appeared in the caption but where she did not sign the
petition, the court had permitted the non-signing spouse to adopt the original
petition by filing an amended petition which was late, relating the amendment back to the date the original petition was filed to acquire jurisdiction
of the non-signing spouse. In the order entered in Curry, the court held it
could no longer do this under the new rules unless it was quite clear that
the original petition had been intended as a petition for both spouses.
In John L. & Susanne L. Brooks, Docket No. 8929-74, 63 T.C. No. 69
(March 24, 1975), however, the court indicated that while it will generally not
favor amendments to a petition out of time attempting to alter either the
tax in issue or the years in dispute, it will continue to interpret the rules
liberally to retain jurisdiction of a proper party if the original petition and
the circumstances make it reasonably clear that it was intended to be a
petition for that party and the party ratifies the action of the party who
signed the petition by an amendment, even if filed late. The court relies
rather heavily on cases applying the old rules and on Rule 60(a) to make
this distinction. Rule 41(a) refers to amendments conferring jurisdiction
over "a matter" while Rule 60 is concerned with proper parties. Respondent
argued that in the new rules the court had substituted a "mechanical test"
for the "intent test" used under the old rules and that for administrative
purposes a "mechanical test" would be better. The court rejected this argument insofar as it applies to ratification of a petition by a proper party.
Rule 51 provides that if -a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
permitted or required is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably
be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move 'for a more definite
statement. Except for minor changes in language, this rule is the counterpart of the old Rule 17(c)(1). However, the availability of discovery in the
new rules may have an effect on the application of this rule, as indicated in
Frank Ryskiewicz, 63 T.C. 83 (1974). In that case, petitioner moved for a
more definite statement of respondent's allegations of fraud in his answer.
Concluding that, while petitioner might be entitled to more information
regarding respondent's allegations of fraud, the answer met the "fair notice"
requirements of Rule 31(a) and the required form and content of an
answer under Rule 86(b), the court denied the motion for a more definite
statement in the pleading. The court suggested that discovery procedures of
Rules 70 and 71 were available to petitioner under which he might obtain
the information sought.
There is also an interesting discussion of Rule 51 in a Memorandum Sur
Order issued in Herman M. & Barbara J. Greenspan, Docket No. 4602-73
(April 15, 1974). In that case respondent determined that a purported loan
received by petitioner from Hughes Tool Co. was taxable as ordinary income.
In response to petitioner's allegation that the amount received was a loan,'
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respondent's answer alleged in rather vague terms that it was recompense for
petitioner's past, present, and future services to Hughes Tool Co. Petitioners
filed a motion for a more definite statement, to which respondent objected on
the following grounds: (1) That no responsive pleading to the answer was
required; (2) That the pleading was not vague and ambiguous; (3) That the
facts involved were peculiarly within the knowledge of petitioner; and
(4) That the motion was an attempt to shift the burden of proof to respondent.
The presiding judge denied the motion, agreeing with respondent that, since
petitioners had the burden of proof, a reply to respondent's answer was
not required by Rule 37 and, hence, one requirement of Rule 51 was not met;
that respondent's answer was sufficiently definitive to give petitioner fair
notice of respondent's position; and that numerous cases interpreting Rule
12(e) of the FRCP, upon which Rule 51 is based, have denied motions for a
more definite statement when the facts were peculiarly within the knowledge
of the other party.
This memorandum is interesting in several respects. It implies that a
motion for a more definite statement is not permitted unless a responsive
pleading is required, but it is doubtful that such was intended. It again points
out that "the specific details and reasons for the respondent's position are
more properly flushed out under our rules dealing with discovery and admissions," which would not have been the case under the old rules. The
court utilizes cases interpreting a similar rule of the FRCP in upholding
respondent's third objection. With regard to respondent's fourth objection,
it emphasizes a point that counsel for the parties often fail to understand: the
granting of a motion for a more definite statement does not shift a legally
imposed burden of proof.
Rule 60 deals with the proper parties to bring a case. The first part of
paragraph (a) is derived from old Rule 6, but the second sentence is adopted
from FRCP 17(a). The latter provides that a case timely brought shall not be
dismissed on the ground that it is not properly brought in behalf of a party
until a reasonable time has been allowed, after objection, for ratification by
such party of the bringing of the case, which ratification shall then relate back
to the time the petition was filed. A Memorandum Sur Order entered in
Estate of Herman J. Adelmann, Deceased, Mrs. Mabel E. Adelmann, the former Administratrix Cum Testamento Annexo, Docket No. 558-74 (Sept. 17,
1974), highlights the importance of the latter provision of Rule 60 in cases
where the petition is not filed until after an estate has been closed, as was
the situation in that case. While the notice of deficiency was addressed to
Mrs. Adelmann as administratrix of the estate, the petition was captioned as
shown above because the petitioner did not want to go on record as still being
the fiduciary for the estate when she had, in fact, been discharged. Respondent
moved to dismiss on the ground that the petition was not filed by the proper
party. Pointing out that the Tax Court has maintained a rather liberal
policy concerning the wording of captions on petitions filed by discharged
fiduciaries of closed estates, the presiding judge denied respondent's motion
because it was clear from the petition that it was filed on behalf of the
closed estate rather than on behalf of the former fiduciaries in their individual

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss4/1

8

Drennan: New Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Unites States Tax Cour
19751

NEW TAX COURT RULES

capacities. This rule as presently written provides a solution for the discharged fiduciary to make his or her point but then ratify the timely filed
petition even after the 90 days have expired. However, practitioners should
keep in mind Rule 41(a), discussed in the Curry case above.
Discovery and Other Pre-TrialProcedures

The next cases discussed are concerned with the discovery rules and
other rules providing pre-trial procedures for obtaining and presenting to
the court evidentiary facts and with the enforcement of those rules.
First, a few general statements regarding the approach of the Tax Court
in adopting rules authorizing discovery and other pre-trial procedures might
be helpful in understanding the court's interpretation and application of
those rules. As heretofore mentioned, the judges of the court were somewhat
reluctant to provide for discovery because of the fear that it would disrupt
the stipulation procedure, which had worked so well in the past, and that the
enforcement of discovery procedures would, because of the court's extensive
geographical jurisdiction, require so much of the judges' time that they
would not be able to make timely disposition of cases on their merits. Consequently, only limited discovery procedures were provided, by written
interrogatories and by motions to produce documents and things, which
could be implemented without permission of the court and should not involve
the judges to any great extent. Discovery by oral deposition was not provided
because it was felt that such procedure would place an undue and unnecessary
burden on the court. Requests for admissions, which, of course, are not discovery devices, were permitted and the requirement for stipulation of facts
was emphasized. No particular sequence for use of the pre-trial informationseeking devices was specified and the scope of discovery permitted was quite
broad, being authorized in Rule 70(b) with respect to "any matter not
privileged and which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
case." Rule 70(b) also provides that if the information or response sought is
otherwise proper, it is not objectionable merely because it involves an opinion
or contention that relates to fact or to the application of law to fact. Timing
for commencement and completion of discovery had to be rather strictly circumscribed to avoid having cases called for trial before the parties had completed discovery and had had time to prepare for trial.
Rule 70 contains the general provisions relative to discovery, describing
the methods provided for, and the scope of, discovery. It emphasizes that
the court expects the parties to attempt to attain the objectives of discovery
through informal consultation prior to utilizing the discovery procedures, and
that information or evidence obtained through discovery or other pre-trial
procedures will not be considered as evidence in a case until either incorporated in a stipulation or offered in evidence at the trial.
The court quickly indicated in its opinion in Branerton Corp., 61 T.C. 691
(1974), that the above admonitions contained in Rule 70 mean what they
say. The pleadings in that case had been completed about four months before the new rules became effective January 1, 1974, but the parties had had no
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conferences to exchange information and stipulate facts for trial. On January
2, 1974, petitioner served numerous interrogatories on respondent, and
respondent sought a protective order. The court granted a protective order
for a reasonable period of time and directed the parties to confer informally
for exchange of information before using discovery. The opinion pointed
out that the stipulation process had been for many years, and still is, the bedrock of Tax Court practice, that essential to this process is the voluntary exchange of necessary facts, that discovery was not intended to weaken the
stipulation process, and that the attempted use of interrogatories at this stage
of the proceedings sharply conflicted with the intent and purpose of Rule
70(a) and constituted an abuse of the court's procedures.
In John T. & Katherine J. Gauthier, 62 T.C. 245 (1974), the court
denied an application to take pre-trial deposition because Rule 81(a) limits
the use of pre-trial depositions to the perpetuation of testimony and because
a deposition for the purpose of discovery is specifically disallowed by Rule
70(a). It also held that the failure of the rules to provide for discovery by
deposition did not constitute a denial of "due process" because the rules are
procedural, not substantive, in nature, and section 7453 of the Internal
Revenue Code provides that the Tax Court may prescribe its own rules of
practice and procedure.
Howard C. Phelps, 62 T.C. 513 (1974), involved the question of whether
a statement prepared by revenue agents during the course of and after an
interview with the petitioner but not signed by petitioner qualified as a statement that must be produced under Rule 70(c). Rule 70(c) was derived from
Rule 26(b)(3), FRCP, wherein "statement" is defined as either a signed
statement or a "recording ... which is a substantially verbatim recital of an
oral statement . . . contemporaneously recorded." The court relied on this
definition to conclude that the document prepared by the agents qualified
as a statement made by petitioner and should be produced.
The opinion in P. T. & L. Construction Co., 63 T.C. No. 36 (1974), contains an exhaustive discussion of the availability through discovery of various
documents prepared by agents of the Internal Revenue Service prior to issuance of the notice of deficiency, including the special agent's report, the
report of the appellate conferee, and a witness's statement taken by the
special agent during the course of his fraud investigation. Respondent objected to the production of these documents on various grounds, including
(1) the work product rule 3 (2) executive privilege, (3) lack of relevance,
and (4) the fact that the witness's statement was to be used for impeachment purposes and thus should not be produced until after cross-examination
of witnesses. Space does not permit a detailed discussion of this opinion.
Briefly, it held that the conferee's report and the special agent's report were
not protected by the "work product" rule because they were not prepared in
anticipation of litigation. However, certain parts of the special agent's report
were protected by the claim of qualified executive privilege, which involves
3. The Tax Court rules do not require disclosure of "work product" as does Rule 26(b)(3),
FRGP, which was adopted as a result of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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statements of advice, deliberation, and recommendations, which might be
embarrassing to the government officials if made public. Since the conferee's
report contained no new facts and was a part of the IRS decisional process,
there was no need to produce it. As there was no showing of prior inconsistent
statements of a witness that might be impeached by use of the third party
statement, which respondent appeared to want to withhold for purposes of
surprise only, it was ordered produced. The final paragraph of the opinion
states:
[T]he basic purpose of discovery is to reduce surprise by providing
a means for the parties to obtain knowledge of all the relevant facts.
What is relevant is the factual information which may either reveal
evidence that will be admissible at the trial or lead to the discovery
of such evidence. Mental impressions, legal analysis, conclusions, and
recommendations are generally not relevant.
Rule 71 provides for discovery by written interrogatories, which can be
served only on another party to the action, not on third parties. This differs
from old Rule 46 in that the questions are in writing and the answers are in
writing, whereas the interrogatories permitted under old Rule 46 contemplated
written questions orally propounded to the witness, whose answers were
stenographically reported. A Memorandum Sur Order entered November 12,
1974, in Samuel Shapiro, Docket No. 178-74, involved Rule 71 interrogatories
served by petitioner on respondent seeking detailed information on how
respondent arrived at his determination of the gross income of a purported
seller of narcotics and whether the determination was based on illegally obtained evidence. Respondent answered some of the questions, refused to
answer others on the grounds that the information sought was irrelevant and
that it was impeaching evidence, and stated that insofar as his records revealed, there was no evidence of electronic eavesdropping. The court accepted respondent's denial of eavesdropping evidence for the present. But
since respondent admitted that some of the information sought supported
his determination, the court reasoned that it should be produced even though
it might also be used for impeachment, because its primary purpose was not
for impeachment. The judge ordered respondent to furnish him with
answers to the questions seeking the sources of the information upon which
the claim of unreported narcotics income was based, for in camera inspection
first if respondent so requested.
This memorandum also discusses at some length whether the court will
go behind the deficiency notice to examine the evidence upon which it is
based or respondent's motives and administrative policies. The judge concluded that while normally the court will not look behind the deficiency
notice, the protective shield of the notice of deficiency is not absolute, and
under limited circumstances the court will inquire into the factual foundations upon which the notice rests -for instance, whether it is based on
constitutionally obtained evidence and whether it is arbitrary and capricious.
A finding that it is arbitrary would not invalidate the notice of deficiency; it
would simply affect the burden of proof.
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A Memorandum Sur Order entered in Rose Morgan, Docket No. 1251-74
(March 4, 1975), also illustrates the court's insistence that the parties cooperate in exchanging information, through either informal conferences or
voluntary discovery, before involving the court. While it does not appear
on the record, counsel for the opposing parties were taking more of the
judge's time arguing about whether petitioner's numerous interrogatories
should be answered than it would have taken the judge to try the case. The
judge finally made an exhaustive review of each of the 45 interrogatories
and ruled on which should be answered and which should not, but in doing
so made the comment that this was a "striking illustration of how the
discovery rules of the Court should not be used."
Rule 72 covers the second method of discovery provided by the rules,
requests for production of documents and things, served on the opposing
party without leave of court. In Kazuko S. Marsh, 62 T.C. 256 (1974), the
question arose as to whether, in response to petitioner's request, respondent
was required to produce various documents relative to petitioner's entry into
and departure from the United States and her residential citizenship status
therein, which respondent did not have in its possession but which were obtainable from other agencies of the government, either by respondent or by
petitioner upon direct request to those agencies. The court held that since
the documents pertained to petitioner and were available to her from agencies
which actually had possession thereof, petitioner could best specify those she
sought from the various agencies, and respondent was not required to produce
them for her.
In a Memorandum Sur Order entered in First Federal Savings & Loan
Association of Lincoln, Docket No. 7690-73 (Dec. 27, 1974), petitioner's
motion to produce, filed after respondent refused its request for certain information, was denied because the information sought was not shown to be
relevant, which, while not mentioned in Rule 72, is a requirement for anything sought to be discovered under Rule 70. See P.T. & L. Construction Co.,
supra. The court avoided having to rule on petitioner's motion to require
respondent to produce the reports and supporting memoranda of the revenue
agent and the appellate conferee when respondent agreed, at the hearing on
the motion, to produce the documents sought, as discussed in a Memorandum
Sur Order in Matson Navigation Co. and Alexander & Baldwin, Inc.,
Docket Nos. 1925-74 and 1926-74 (Feb. 27, 1975). See also Malcolm D.
Murphy, T.C. Memo. 1975-88 (Mar. 31, 1975), which discusses what parts
of various IRS instructions to its agents about giving Miranda warnings
must be produced in response to a motion under Rule 72.
Title VIII, including Rules 80-85, permits the taking of depositions,
upon application to and approval by the court, for the purpose of making
testimony or any document or thing available as evidence, in the circumstances
therein authorized. It is specifically stated that depositions are not to be
taken for discovery purposes. These rules provide the procedure for taking
both domestic and foreign depositions and for the use thereof.
In a Memorandum Sur Order entered in Laurence J. & Joan C. Hoch,
Docket No. 6262-73 (Apr. 9, 1974), it is made clear that depositions may be
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taken only if "there is a substantial risk that the person . . . involved will

not be available at the trial of the case," Rule 81(a), even though many of
the witnesses petitioner intended to use in this case lived more than 700 miles
from the place of trial. An order entered in Edwin F. Gordon, Docket No.
4825-71 (Jan. 15, 1975), granted an application to take foreign depositions
and directed the procedure to be followed in connection therewith.
Title IX provides for requests for admissions and stipulations for trial,
Rule 90 being concerned with admissions and Rule 91 with stipulations and
the procedures to be followed if the opposing party refuses to stipulate. Those
procedures are similar to the procedure authorized in old Rule 31(b)(5), but
the time schedule is moved forward somewhat. Except for the frequent
references to stipulations in rulings specifically concerned with other rules,
there have been no opinions or memoranda dealing directly with Rule 91.
Rule 90, dealing with requests for admissions, is taken from FRGP 36,
the purpose of which is to establish matters which are not in dispute and
thereby to avoid the time and effort needed to prove them at trial. Requests
for admissions may be served only on the opposing party and may be served
without leave of the court, but the original of the request must be filed with
the court. Each matter is deemed admitted unless, within 30 days after the
service of the request, the party upon whom it is served serves upon the requesting party a written answer or an objection.
In John W. Pearsall, 62 T.G. 9% (1974), petitioner served a request for
admissions on respondent and respondent filed a motion for a protective
order without first serving either written answers admitting or denying the
requested admissions or objections thereto. The court denied respondent's
motion for a protective order as being premature, pointing out that unlike
Rule 70(a), there is no requirement in Rule 90 that the parties confer informally before requesting admissions.
Title X contains general provisions relating to discovery, depositions and
requests for admissions. Rule 101 makes clear that no particular sequence is
required in the use of these procedures nor are there limitations on the frequency of their use, provided they do not delay progress of the case toward
trial. Rule 102 requires supplementation of responses with information
thereafter acquired; Rule 103 authorizes issuance of protective orders; and
Rule 104 provides enforcement action and sanctions.
Rule 103 authorizes the court to make any order which justice requires to
protect a party or other person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense, including but not limited to a list of 10
specific types of protective orders. In Greenberg's Express, Inc., 62 T.G. 324
(1974), petitioners sought an order under Rule 103(a)(10) impounding various
categories of documents in the possession, custody, or control of respondent
or other government agencies to prevent their possible destruction and to
enable petitioners to obtain evidence to prove their allegation that respondent
discriminatorily selected their tax returns for a second examination because
of their purported connection with organized crime. The court denied petitioner's motion to impound because petitioner had not shown a need therefor,
the documents were probably obtainable by use of discovery, and impound-
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ment is not customarily used to compel production of documents, but rather
as a means of retaining documents in the court's custody after they have been
properly produced by other means.
In a Memorandum Sur Order entered in Paul & Mamie Patz, Docket Nos.
4711-72 through 4725-72 (July 23, 1974), respondent sought to introduce in
evidence the tax returns of a corporate competitor of petitioners through its
president, whom petitioners had called as a witness in a section 482 case. The
court sustained petitioners' objection, pointing out, inter alia, that until it
was clearly established that the competitor's returns were relevant and necessary
for respondent's case, the court would protect the confidentiality the returns
were granted under the law.
In another recent case in which it has not yet become necessary to enter
an order, both parties served extensive interrogatories on the other and both
sought protective orders. The court granted a continuance of the hearing
on the motions requested by both parties but instructed the clerk to advise
counsel for both parties that unless they made a sincere effort to stipulate the
facts sought through voluntary communications, the court would be inclined to grant protective orders to both parties, to deny the right of either
party to utilize any further discovery procedures, and to direct the parties to
submit a comprehensive stipulation of facts before trial.
Under Rule 104, if a party fails to appear for the taking of his deposition
or fails to answer or respond to discovery procedures, the aggrieved party may
move for an order compelling compliance with the request. If the party against
whom the order is issued fails to obey the order, the court may enter such
sanctioning orders as are just, including those set forth in the four subparagraphs of Rule 104(c), which include contempt of court.
In a Memorandum Sur Order entered September 27, 1974, in Elizabeth
Taylor Burton, Docket Nos. 8382-72 and 8383-72, respondent moved for an
order compelling petitioner to produce all her income tax returns filed with
other jurisdictions for the years involved, or for sanctions if she failed to do
so, to attempt to prove under section 877 of the Code that petitioner had renounced her United States citizenship to save taxes. The judge denied respondent's motion for various reasons, including the fact that, although they
might be helpful, respondent did not need the documents to carry his burden
of proof.
In a Memorandum Sur Order entered March 3, 1975, in Milton F. Meisner,
Docket No. 7365-74, petitioner served interrogatories on respondent in order
to obtain factual information that petitioner was under criminal investigation,
arguing that, if such were the case, to fully plead facts in support of his allegations of error in the notice of deficiency would tend to incriminate him.
Despite respondent's admission that petitioner was under criminal investigation and his agreement to a stay of the civil proceedings, petitioner moved
for an order to compel answers to the interrogatories. The judge denied the
motion on the grounds that the answers were unnecessary and beyond the
scope of the discovery rules, which do not permit petitioner to inquire into
the nature and scope of the criminal investigation by the use of interrogatories.
A 12-month stay was granted.
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Proceduresfor Decision Without Trial
Title XII of the rules provides four means of proceeding to a decision
without trial: Rule 120- judgment on the pleadings; Rule 121 - summary
judgment; Rule 122- submission on fully stipulated facts; and Rule 123 default and dismissal. All except Rule 122 are new in the Tax Court rules,
although the court has at times reached the result accomplished by the other
three rules. The new rules are derived from the FRCP. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only when the pleadings do not raise
a genuine issue of fact, but only issues of law. A summary judgment may be
granted as to all or any part of the legal issues involved where, although there
is a dispute as to facts under the pleadings, it can be shown through materials
outside the pleadings that there is no genuine issue of fact. In a submission
under Rule 122 all the material facts are stipulated by the parties. When a
party has failed to plead or otherwise proceed as provided by the rules of
the court, he may be held in default and the court may enter a decision against
the defaulting party; or if the petitioner fails properly to prosecute the case,
the court may dismiss the case and decide any or all issues against petitioner
or the party having the burden of proof on the issue. A decision rendered
on default or dismissal, other than dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, operates
as an adjudication on the merits.
An illustration of the use of a motion for judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 120 is found in Thomas A. Shaheen, Jr., 62 T.C. 359 (1974). In his
amended answer respondent alleged that a default judgment entered by a
United States district court on petitioner's tax liability for the years involved
in the Tax Court proceeding was res judicata. Since the pleadings did not
raise any issues of fact relative to this legal question and the court agreed
with respondent on the legal issue that disposed of the case, the motion for
judgment on the pleadings was granted.
In Paul A. Leatherman, T.C. Memo. 1975-41 (Feb. 27, 1975), and Ruth
Fales, T.C. Memo. 1975-52 (Mar. 10, 1975), the only issues raised by the
pleadings were whether the payment of "war taxes" violated petitioner's
constitutional rights. The court found that motions for judgment on the
pleadings were appropriate.
Several cases decided by the Tax Court in 1974 involved motions for
summary judgment under Rule 121. In James T. Shiosaki, 61 T.C. 861 (1974),
respondent relied on collateral estoppel of a prior case involving the same
issue in petitioner's tax liability for preceding years to move for summary
judgment. The court concluded that since petitioner's intent (to make a
profit) was an issue in the case, collateral estoppel would not apply and
the motion for summary judgment was denied. The burden is on the
movant to establish absence of a factual issue, and when respondent failed to
establish this, there was no burden on petitioner to establish existence of a
a factual issue. But in Stewart Gammill, Ii, 62 T.C. 607 (1974), the court
granted summary judgment on respondent's plea of collateral estoppel, because no issue of intent was involved and because respondent was able to
establish that there was no genuine dispute as to any material facts.
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In a Memorandum Sur Order entered in J. Ray McDermott & Co., Docket
No. 5301-73 (July 9, 1974), petitioner's motion for a partial summary judgment on a section 482 issue was denied. The judge noted that the granting
of a summary judgment that is opposed by one of the parties is the exception
in federal practice, and the existence of any reasonable doubt as to the facts
at issue must result in a denial of the motion. The judge also noted that it is
inappropriate for the court to make findings of fact under a motion for
summary judgment, as requested by respondent. See also Julius E. Hoeme,
63 T.C. No. 3 (Oct. 15, 1974), wherein the court stated that the summary
judgment rule does not contemplate judgment on evidentiary matters such
as burden of proof.
In William F. Henry, 62 T.C. 605 (1974), the court granted respondent's
motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether a money judgment petitioner received in a lawsuit for breach of his employment contract
was taxable as ordinary income or not taxable at all. Respondent attached
to his motion copies of the pleadings in the breach of contract suit which
showed there was no genuine issue of fact in this proceeding. The opinion in
this case is also notable because it concluded that in a case heard by a commissioner of the court, where there is no material issue of fact involved, the
post-trial procedure prescribed by Rule 182 for commissioner-tried cases is
not applicable.
In John Albert Gilday, 62 T.C. 260 (1974), respondent affirmatively alleged fraud in his answer. When petitioner failed to reply, respondent moved
under old Rule 18(c) (new Rule 37(c)) that the affrmative allegations in his
answer be deemed admitted, which motion was granted. When the case was
called for trial, petitioner failed to appear and respondent moved for judgment
by default on the fraud issue, based on the facts deemed admitted. Since
respondent had the burden of proving fraud, the court concluded that it must
decide whether the facts deemed admitted carried respondent's burden of
proving fraud and denied the motion for judgment by default on the fraud
issue. Upon consideration of the admitted facts, however, the court made a
finding of fraud and entered decision for respondent.
Burden of Proof
Rule 142 deals with the burden of proof. Paragraph (a) states that,
except as provided in paragraphs (b)-(e), the burden of proof is on petitioner,
and that in respect of any new matter, increases in deficiency, and affirmative
defenses pleaded in his answer, the burden shall be upon respondent.
In a Memorandum Sur Order entered November 1, 1974, in I.S.C., Inc.,
Docket No. 3653-74, the question was whether the reasons stated in respondent's answer for disallowance of a deduction for contributions made
by petitioner to its pension plan differed sufficiently from the reasons stated
in the notice of deficiency to constitute "new matters" which shifted the
burden of proof to respondent under Rule 142(a). Holding that it did not, the
judge stated that the fact that the reasons for disallowing the deduction were
badly expressed in the notice of deficiency does not shift the burden of proof
where petitioner knew that the reasons raised in the answer were in issue.
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Small Tax Case Procedure
Rule 172, which provides for the election of the small tax case procedure
where the amount of the deficiency placed in dispute does not exceed $1,500
for any one year (see Rule 171), was involved in a Memorandum Sur Order
entered in John W. & Ann D. Nichols, Docket No. 6766-74S. In the notice of
deficiency, for two of the three years involved respondent disallowed deductions of amounts which produced deficiencies in excess of $1,500. In their
petition, taxpayers alleged error in the disallowance of all of the expenses
claimed but in paragraph three alleged that only $1,500 of the deficiencies
was in dispute. Respondent objected to petitioners' election of the small tax
case procedure for those two years. Concluding that it was inconsistent for
petitioner to dispute the entire amount of the proposed adjustments but only
a part of the deficiencies produced thereby, the judge sustained respondent's
objection on the pleadings- as they then. stood, suggesting, however, -that
petitioners could amend their petition to -contest a lesser amount of the deductions disallowed and thus qualify for the small tax case procedure.
I believe the above rather exhaustive discussion refers to all rulings issued
by the court and the judges thereof on the new rules from January 1, 1974,
the date the new rules became effective, until April 1, 1975, the date this
report was completed. I make no attempt to generalize the court's attitude or
approach in applying the new rules; I simply hope this reference to these
not-too-well publicized rulings will permit the concerned party or practitioner
to inspect those rulings and draw those conclusions for himself.
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